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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 8, 2004, in Crawford v. Washington, the United States Su-
preme Court made a fundamental change in its interpretation of the United
States Constitution's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause as it applies to
1
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certain out-of-court statements.' Prior to Crawford, the Supreme Court had
consistently held that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation did
not prevent the admissibility of a witness's out-of-court statement, despite the
witness being unavailable at trial, so long as the pertinent statement bore "an
adequate indicia of reliability."2 The Court previously determined that an out-
of-court statement had "an adequate indicia of reliability" when the statement
fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or had "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness."' 3 In Crawford, by a 7-2 decision, the Court rejected this
analysis. Justice Scalia, the author of the Crawford majority, in rejecting the
former jurisprudence quipped that "[dlispensing with confrontation because
testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a
defendant is obviously guilty."' 4 Instead, Crawford adopted a new framework in
determining whether a defendant's right to confrontation bars certain out-of-
court statements from being introduced at trial. Crawford holds that any out-of-
court testimonial statement made by a witness not present at trial is barred under
the Confrontation Clause, unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.5
According to numerous experts in the legal community, one area of the
law where Crawford will likely have a significant impact is child abuse prosecu-
tion6 because the allegedly abused child is often times unavailable to testify at
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
provides that "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted
with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). In Roberts, the Court found that despite a
witness being unavailable at trial, the introduction of the witness's out-of-court statement did not
violate the defendant's right to confrontation because the defendant was able to cross-examine the
witness at a preliminary hearing. Id. at 73. The Court determined that the out-of-court statement
possessed an adequate indicia of reliability because the defendant sufficiently cross-examined the
witness at the pre-trial hearing. Id. It should be noted, however, that while Roberts allowed the
out-of-court statement in because of the prior cross-examination deemed it reliable, nowhere did
Roberts require that cross-examination was necessary to ensure reliability. Thus, Roberts specifi-
cally held that reliability of a statement "could be inferred without more in a case where the evi-
dence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or where there is "a showing of particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness" in the statement. Id. at 66. For more discussion of Roberts,
See infra Part II, A.
3 Id.
4 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
5 See id. at 59.
6 See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision Restores Con-
frontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST. 4, 10 (2004) [hereinafter Adjusting to Craw-
ford](stating that "Another type of case that will frequently test the limits of the term testimonial
[from Crawford] involves statements by children, typically alleging some kind of abuse."); 5-802
JACK B. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 802.05 (2004) (raising questions about
how child hearsay in child abuse cases will be affected by the Crawford decision); Victor Vieth,
Keeping the Balance True: Admitting Child Hearsay in the Wake of Crawford v. Washington, 16
UPDATE ExPREss 12 (2004) (claiming that "[tihe United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
6th Amendment Confrontation Clause in such a manner as to undermine the ability of prosecutors
[Vol. 108
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trial. Specifically, an allegedly abused child will either refuse to testify because
the child fears testifying in the presence of the defendant, or a court can declare
the child incompetent to testify at trial based on the child's young age or intel-
lect.7 Prior to Crawford, despite a child being unavailable to testify, prosecutors
were usually successful in getting the child's out-of-court statements admitted at
trial either through a state statutory scheme or through various exceptions to the
hearsay rule. Both of these methods allowed a court to admit such statements
under the Supreme Court's previous analysis of reliability. 8  However, recent
post-Crawford child abuse cases demonstrate that a successful prosecution of a
child abuse case will be more difficult because Crawford bars the admission of
any out-of-court testimonial statement made by a person that the defendant will
not have the opportunity to confront at trial.9 In a country that seeks to protect
the most vulnerable and defenseless, Crawford's potential result of allowing
child abusers to likely go free simply because the child was unable to testify at
trial does not square with any sense of societal justice.
to admit child hearsay statements when the child is unavailable for testimony"). See also Richard
P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Wit-
nesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 511, 518 (2004) (stating that "Crawford's impact on the types of
hearsay often admitted in child abuse prosecutions is particularly uncertain").
7 See Wendy N. Davis, Hearsay, Gone Tomorrow?, A.B.A. J. 23 (2004) (quoting Victor
Vieth, director of the Alexandria, Virginia-based American Prosecutors Research Institute's Na-
tional Child Protection Training Center) who believes that "[t]he child abuse cases that will be
impacted by Crawford are those involving preschool-aged children or severely mentally retarded
victims who are declared incompetent to testify."); Sherrie Bourg Carter & Bruce M. Lyons, The
Potential Impact of Crawford v. Washington on Child Abuse, Elderly Abuse and Domestic Vio-
lence Litigation, CHAMPION 21, 22 (Oct. 2004) (explaining that "[in child abuse cases, the issue
of unavailability [of the child] typically arises either because the child is deemed incompetent to
testify (usually as a result of lack of knowledge or understanding due to age or intellect) or be-
cause the child is "emotionally unavailable" to testify due to the presence of the defendant in the
courtroom."); see also, American Academy of Pediatrics, The Child in Court: A Subject Review,
104 PEDIATRICS 1145, 1146 (1999) (stating that some researchers believe that "child witnesses
will experience distress sufficient to affect the reliability of their testimony and exacerbate their
feelings of victimization and stigmatization" if forced to testify in front of their alleged abuser.)
8 See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 350 (1992) (The United States Supreme Court did
not find any Confrontation Clause violation because the child's out-of-court statements fell within
two recognized hearsay exceptions: spontaneous declaration and statements made in the course of
securing medical treatment.).
9 See, e.g., Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004). In Snowden, the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland excluded out-of-court statements made by an alleged abused child
to a social worker because the court found the statement to be testimonial, and the defendant did
not have an opportunity to cross-examine the child. Id. at 47. People ex rel. R.A.S., 111 P.3d 487,
491 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (excluding a child's out-of-court statement to a police investigator
because the statement was deemed testimonial, and the defendant did not have the opportunity to
cross-examine the child). See also, United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 555-57 (8th Cir.
2005) (holding that an allegedly abused child's out-of-court statements to a forensic interviewer
were inadmissible in violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because
the statements were testimonial and the defendant did not have the opportunity to cross-examine
the child at trial).
2005]
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Accordingly, the overall purpose of this Note is to address some of the
problems that Crawford presents for child abuse prosecution and to offer practi-
cal solutions to mitigate some of these effects.10 In order to fully understand
how Crawford fundamentally altered the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence and assess Crawford's likely significant impact on future child
abuse prosecutions, this Note will first briefly discuss the Supreme Court's pre-
Crawford analysis of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. Part III will
provide a short synopsis of the facts, history, and holding of Crawford. Next,
Part IV will seek to analyze the central question left outstanding in Crawford's
holding: what types of utterances actually constitute out-of-court testimonial
statements? As the Supreme Court explained, if the out-of-court statement is
found by a court to be non-testimonial then Crawford is not implicated.11 Craw-
ford provided three potential definitions of a testimonial statement. However,
the Court ultimately declared, "[w]e leave for another day any effort to spell out
a comprehensive definition of "testimonial." "Whatever else the term covers, it
applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand
jury, or a former trial, and to police interrogations."' 2 In an attempt to provide
concrete, practical solutions on how to successfully prosecute a post-Crawford
child abuser, this Note will argue for a specific, confined definition of an out-of-
court testimonial statement that courts should apply in the future.
Part V will outline some of the most common types of hearsay excep-
tions utilized by prosecutors in a child abuse case and will analyze the effects
that Crawford will have on a prosecutor's ability to use these exceptions in the
future. Next, Part VI will discuss the principle that a defendant can forfeit his
right to confrontation and will argue for an expansion of this concept, which
could potentially render Crawford's implications on child abuse prosecution
moot in some circumstances. Finally, Part VII will argue that prosecutors, in a
post-Crawford world, should increasingly utilize and rely upon alternative
methods of testimony when Crawford necessitates that the allegedly abused
child testify at trial.
10 Many states statutorily define child abuse in a variety of different ways. Therefore, for the
purpose of this Note, child abuse will loosely be defined as the physical, emotional, or sexual
misconduct of children under the age of eighteen by an individual or individuals, where the mis-
treatment of the child rises to the level of a criminal offense. For a medical definition of child
abuse or maltreatment, see RICHARD E. BEHRMAN ET AL., NELSON'S TEXTBOOK OF PEDIATRICS 121
(17th ed. 2004) (stating that child abuse or maltreatment "encompasses a spectrum of abusive
actions, or acts of commission, and lack of action, or acts of omission, that result in morbidity or
death" of the child).
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II. THE OLD CONFRONTATION CLAUSE REGIME: OHIO V. ROBERTS AND ITS
PROGENY
A. Ohio v. Roberts
Prior to Crawford, the United States Supreme Court took a very differ-
ent approach to determine whether an out-of-court statement used at trial vio-
lated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The seminal case
that previously governed the United States Supreme Court's analysis of the
Confrontation Clause was the 1980 decision of Ohio v. Roberts.13 Roberts spe-
cifically dealt with a defendant, who had been charged with forgery of checks
and possession of stolen credit cards.' 4 At a preliminary hearing, the defen-
dant's counsel cross-examined the daughter of the individual whose checks and
credit cards were allegedly forged and stolen by the defendant. 15 During the
testimony, the daughter repeatedly denied the defendant's accusation that the
items were given to the defendant to use.16 A year later, after repeated efforts to
contact the daughter to testify at the defendant's trial, the prosecution success-
fully introduced the transcript from the daughter's preliminary hearing testi-
mony implicating the defendant in the crimes. 17 The defendant objected to the
introduction of the daughter's prior statements as a violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation because the defendant was unable to cross-
examine the daughter at trial.'
8
The United States Supreme Court rejected this contention. Instead, the
Court put forth a Confrontation Clause analysis that would essentially govern
the admissibility of all out-of-court statements for the next twenty-four years.
Roberts held:
When a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination
at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing
that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible
only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can
be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the
evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness. 19
13 448 U.S. 56 (1980).




18 Id. at 59.
19 Id. at 66.
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Applying this analysis, the Court concluded that the transcript in ques-
tion bore sufficient indicia of reliability and was thus admissible at trial.2°
B. The Narrowing of Roberts: United States v. Inadi and White v. Illinois
After Roberts, the next twelve years saw the Supreme Court greatly re-
strict its holding twice, especially in regards to the Roberts language that the
Confrontation Clause required a showing of unavailability. First, in 1986, in
United States v. Inadi, the Supreme Court clarified and narrowed the Roberts
analysis by concluding that a witness's unavailability was a necessary part of
the inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statement was made in the
course of a prior judicial proceeding.21 Six years later, in White v. Illinois,22 the
United States Supreme Court all but extinguished the requirement that a witness
must be unavailable in order for his or her out-of-court statements to be admit-
ted at trial.
White specifically examined a trial court's decision to admit an abused
child's out-of-court statements to various people, including the child's babysit-
ter, the child's mother, a police officer, and a doctor.2 3 The defendant objected
to the trial court's decision, claiming that his confrontation right had been vio-
lated because the prosecution made no showing that the child victim was un-
available to testify at trial.24 The trial court rejected the defendant's contention
and found that the out-of-court statements were admissible because they fell
under the recognized hearsay exceptions of spontaneous declaration and state-
ments made for the purpose of a medical diagnosis. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court. Specifically, the Court held:
We therefore think it clear that the out-of-court statements ad-
mitted in this case had substantial probative value, value that
could not be duplicated simply by the declarant later testifying
in court. To exclude such probative statements under the stric-
tures of the Confrontation Clause would be the height of
wrongheadedness (sic) .... Given the evidentiary value of such
statements, their reliability, and that establishing a generally
applicable unavailability rule would have few practical benefits
while imposing pointless litigation costs, we see no reason to
20 Id. at 73.
21 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986) (emphasis added).
22 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
23 Id. at 349-5 1.
24 Id. at 350.
[Vol. 108
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treat the out-of-court statements in this case differently from
those we found admissible in Inadi
The combination of Roberts, Inadi, and White allowed prosecutors all
over the country to offer an abused child's out-of-court statements at trial re-
gardless of whether the child was unavailable. In short, the prosecution would
simply have to show that the child's out-of-court statements bore some indicia
of reliability because the statement fell within either a firnly rooted hearsay
exception or the statement had particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.26
The Roberts-Inadi-White regime27 proved to be extremely successful for prose-
cutors. Prosecutors were no longer concerned about the child either refusing to
testify at trial, or a trial court deciding that the allegedly abused child was in-
competent to testify. Instead, a prosecutor's only task was to demonstrate that
the child's out-of-court statements met one of the numerous recognized hearsay
exceptions, or to otherwise prove that the statement possessed particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness. According to the United States Supreme Court, a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation required nothing more.28
Many legal experts and commentators felt very uneasy about this relaxed ap-
proach taken by the Supreme Court regarding a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right.29 When the Court granted certiorari in Crawford v. Washington, these
25 Id. at 356-57 (emphasis added).
26 Many jurisdictions followed White's reasoning and concluded that the prosecution did not
have to necessarily prove that the abused child witness was unavailable. See, e.g., Ring v. Erik-
son, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that a defendant's contention that the Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation required a finding by the trial court that the abused child was
unavailable is not required. "[W]e now know that whether C.R. (abused child) was unavailable is
irrelevant for the purposes of the Clause." Id.); State v. Anderson, 608 N.W. 2d 644, 657 (S.D.
2000) (holding that in determining whether to admit an abused child's out-of-court statement, a
court is not required by the Constitution's Confrontation Clause to find the child unavailable).
However, it should be noted that a minority of states disregarded White's holding on separate state
constitutional grounds and thus required prosecutors to continue to show that the witness was
unavailable at trial. See, e.g., Kansas v. Willey, 860 P.2d 67, 68 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that as a matter of state constitutional law, the unavailability of the declarant must be shown be-
fore admitting the out-of-court statement).
27 When this Note refers to the Roberts-Inadi-White regime, it is referring to the pre-Crawford
analysis of allowing out-of-court statements in at trial so long as the statements possessed an
indicia of reliability and not requiring the witness to be found unavailable.
28 See, e.g., White, 502 U.S. at 356 (indicating "[w]here proffered hearsay has sufficient guar-
antees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confronta-
tion Clause is satisfied").
29 See, e.g., Sherman J. Clark, An Accuser-Obligation Approach to the Confrontation Clause,
81 NEB. L. REV. 1258, 1260 (2003) (arguing that "[t]his approach (referring to the Roberts-Inadi-
White regime) has produced a doctrine, which is to say the least, unsatisfactory, and under which
the Confrontation Clause has become lost in the arcane of the rule against hearsay."); Richard D.
Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1172 (2002) [here-
inafter Dial-In Testimony] (contending that "the current confrontation doctrine (referring to the
Roberts-Inadi-White regime), geared to improving the reliability of evidence, is fundamentally
misconceived and fails to reflect the basic values of underlying the Confrontation Clause."); Rich-
2005]
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same legal experts fervently argued for a jurisprudential change away from the
Roberts-inadi- White regime.3
III. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
A. Facts and Procedural History
Crawford involved a dispute that arose when the defendant, Michael
Crawford, stabbed a man who had allegedly attempted to rape his wife. 3' The
state of Washington charged the defendant with assault and attempted murder.32
At trial, the defendant claimed self-defense33 and invoked Washington state's
marital privilege to prevent his wife from testifying at his trial.34 However, the
prosecution did play a tape of a previously recorded statement that the defen-
dant's wife made to the police describing the events leading up to the stabbing,
which tended to contradict the defendant's claim of self-defense.35  The defen-
dant objected to the prosecution playing the tape, claiming that the admission of
such evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.36 The trial
court rejected the defendant's argument, applied the Robert's analysis, and de-
termined that the out-of-court statement made by the defendant's wife to the
police was sufficiently trustworthy and was thus admissible.37 The Washington
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that the wife's out-of-court
statement was untrustworthy and inadmissible. The Washington Supreme Court
subsequently overturned the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated the de-
ard D. Friedman, The Conundrum of Children, Confrontation, and Hearsay, 65 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 243, 247 (2002) [hereinafter The Conundrum of Children] (arguing that "[m]ost funda-
mentally, the focus on reliability misses the point of the confrontation right. The Confrontation
Clause is not a constitutionalization of the law of hearsay, with all its oddities. It does not speak
of reliability or of exceptions." Instead, Friedman asserts that "the confrontation right reflects a
belief, central to our system of criminal justice, that a witness against a criminal defendant should
give testimony under prescribed conditions-under oath, in the presence of the accused, subject to
cross-examination, and, if reasonably possible, in open court.").
30 Brief of Amici Curiae of Law Professors Sherman J. Clark, James J. Duane, Richard D.
Friedman, Norman Garland, Gary M. Maveal, Bridget McCormack, David A. Moran, Christopher
B. Mueller, and Roger C. Park at 4, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410).
31 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S 36, 38 (2004).
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. Washington's marital privilege prohibits a spouse from testifying without the other
spouse's consent. See WASH. REV. CODE §5.60.060(1) (1994). However, the marital privilege
does not include a spouse's out-of-court statements that can be introduced at trial under various
hearsay exceptions. See State v. Burden, 841 P.2d 758, 760 (1992).
35 Id. at 38.
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fendant's conviction concluding that the wife's out-of-court statement was reli-
able because it bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.
38
B. Crawford's Holding and Reasoning
By a vote of 9-0, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Wash-
ington Supreme Court's decision to uphold the defendant's conviction. 39 Most
importantly, however, the Court, by a 7-2 majority, overturned the previous
Roberts-Inadi-White regime governing Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
analysis and replaced it with a new testimonial approach to govern the admissi-
bility of out-of-court statements.4n After a lengthy historical discussion by Jus-
tice Scalia, the Court concluded that the "Framers would not have allowed ad-
mission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless
he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination. ' 41
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the
Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protections to
the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous
notions of reliability .... Admitting statements deemed reliable
by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confronta-
tion.42
The Court then addressed what it considered to be an out-of-court testi-
monial statement. The court outlined three possible definitions of these kinds of
statements:
Various formulations of this core class of "testimonial" state-
ments exist: "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional
equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial ex-
aminations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; extrajudi-
38 Id.
39 Id. at 69.
40 Id. at63.
41 Id. at 54. It should be noted that while Crawford suggests that unavailability and cross-
examination are both necessary to admit a testimonial statement, the Court said nothing about
what was actually required to find a witness unavailable. The pre-Crawford unavailability analy-
sis, especially with allegedly abused child witnesses, was quite lenient. See supra note 26. There-
fore, because Crawford does not mention any new law regarding unavailability or overruling this
more lenient standard, it is logical to presume that the Court still believes this prior analysis is
correct for Confrontation Clause purposes.
42 Id. at 61.
20051
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cial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materi-
als, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confes-
sions; [or] statements that were made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.
43
Unfortunately, the Court refused to decide on one of these specific defi-
nitions.44 Instead, the Court concluded:
We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehen-
sive definition of "testimonial." Whatever else the term covers,
it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hear-
ing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial, and to police inter-
rogations.45 [However], [w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at is-
sue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford
the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law-as
does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such
statements from Confrontation scrutiny altogether.46
IV. THE LINCHPIN OF CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON: WHAT CONSTITUTES AN OUT-
OF-COURT "TESTIMONIAL" STATEMENT?
A. The "Testimonial" Approach
While the Crawford majority provided a few illustrations of what actu-
ally constitutes an out-of-court testimonial statement, it is clear that the Court
believes that this kind of statement should not be limited to these few, isolated
43 Id. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted).
44 The Chief Justice who, along with Justice O'Connor, did not want to overrule the Robert's
analysis objected to the majority's refusal to clarify what actually constitutes a testimonial state-
ment. As Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized,
But the thousands of federal prosecutors and the tens of thousands of state
prosecutors need answers as to what beyond the specific kinds of "testimony"
the Court lists, is covered by the new rule. They need them now, not months
or years from now. Rules of criminal evidence are applied everyday in courts
throughout the country, and parties should not be left in the dark in this man-
ner.
Id. at 137. (Rehnquist, C.J. & O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Despite Chief Justice Rehnquist's criticism, Justice Scalia retorted in a footnote that "[w]e ac-
knowledge the Chief Justice's objection that our refusal to articulate a comprehensive definition in
this case will cause interim uncertainty. But it can hardly be any worse than the status quo." Id. at
1374 n. 10 (citations omitted).
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examples.47 Therefore, in order to fully understand the impact that Crawford
will have on the effective prosecution of child abuse cases, one must first estab-
lish a solid, concrete definition of an out-of-court testimonial declaration. First,
it is important to note that the three definitions4 8 proposed by the Crawford ma-
jority come from three different sources. The first suggested definition, "ex
parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable
to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably
expect to be used prosecutorially," comes from the petitioner's (defendant's)
brief in Crawford.49  The next recommended testimonial formulation-
"extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such
as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions," is derived directly
from Justice Thomas's 1992 concurring opinion in White v. Illinois.5° Finally,
the last proposed definition of an out-of-court testimonial declaration, "state-
47 Clearly, if the Court wanted an out-of-court testimonial statement to be restricted to prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial, and to police interro-
gations then the Court would have outright concluded this proposition. The fact that the Majority
called these specific examples the minimum of what constitutes a "testimonial" declaration obvi-
ously implies that there are other out-of-court statements that would also be considered testimo-
nial by the Court.
48 Perhaps some may suggest that there are not really three definitions articulated in Crawford,
but, instead, the three formulations offered in supra note 43 are actually a single, cumulative
definition of a "testimonial" statement. This Note disagrees with this interpretation of Crawford.
Furthermore, most of the academic scholars who have analyzed the Crawford decision believe
that the Court formulated three potential definitions or standards for a testimonial statement, with-
out choosing one of them. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging
and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 511, 530 (2004) (stating that
"[w]ithout adopting any specific formulation, the Court quoted three possible definitions of testi-
monial statements"). See also Adjusting to Crawford, supra note 6, at 9 (stating that "[tihe Court
quoted three standards without choosing among them").
49 Petitioner's Brief at 23, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410). The
Petitioner's definition of an out-of-court testimonial statement was based primarily on a historical
review of the Confrontation Clause jurisprudence through the centuries not unlike the Majority's
historical review in Crawford itself. Id. at 16-22. After tracing the history of the Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence, the Petitioner concluded that "[t]he landscape of these decisions, interpreted
through the prism of the traditional understanding of the right to confrontation, evokes a straight-
forward rule." Id. at 22. What is interesting to note is that the Petitioner's definition refers to
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion, in White v. Illinois, joined by Justice Scalia, as the basis for
his testimonial approach. However, nowhere in Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in White,
does Justice Thomas add the last clause of Petitioner's testimonial definition: "similar pretrial
statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially." Id.
50 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., & Scalia, J., concurring in part,
and concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas stated, "[t]he Confrontation Clause is implicated
by extrajudicial statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials,
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. It was this discrete category of
testimonial statements that was historically abused by prosecutors as a means of depriving crimi-
nal defendants of the benefit of the adversary process." As alluded to in supra note 49, Justice
Thomas does not mention anything about the Confrontation Clause being triggered by any out-of-
court statement that a declarant reasonably believed would be later used prosecutorially.
2005]
11
Staab: Child's Play: Avoiding the Pitfalls of Crawford v. Washington in
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
ments that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective wit-
ness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial," was authored by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
in an amicus brief in Crawford.51 Given these three potential definitions, it is
likely that the United States Supreme Court in the future will have to choose a
single formulation. Currently, most state and federal courts that have applied
the new Crawford analysis have decided not to adopt one of these definitions to
be its guide in determining whether a particular out-of-court statement is admis-
sible under the Confrontation Clause. As an alternative, these courts have ap-
plied all three definitions to the specific out-of-court statement at issue.52 This
Note will not follow the trend of these courts and simply attempt to apply all
three testimonial formulations to the most common hearsay statements that are
at issue in the prosecution of child abuse.53 Instead, this Note will suggest a
51 Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 3, Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410). Amici explains why this definition is appropri-
ate. "The Confrontation Clause should be read to prohibit the admission of any out-of-court
statement unless the defendant has the opportunity to confront the witness. Not every statement
uttered, and later used at trial, is testimonial." Id. at 22. Instead, Amici argues "[aln out-of-court
statement is testimonial only when the circumstances indicate that a reasonable declarant at the
time would understand that the statement would later be available for use at a criminal trial. This
understanding of the Clause flows from the paradigm of the ex parte affidavit that the Confronta-
tion Clause was designed to prevent." Id. Amici concludes, "If the most fundamental point of the
Confrontation Clause is to prevent the State from securing a conviction on the basis of witness
testimony provided to it in private, then defining the category of excluded statements to encom-
pass that evil serves the purpose of the Clause perfectly." Id. at 23 (internal citations omitted).
52 See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 259-60 (Colo Ct. App. 2004) (applying all three of
Crawford's testimonial definitions to a child's out-of-court statements to a police officer on video-
tape); People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 757-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (applying all three of
the definitions to an alleged abused child's out-of-court statements to a police officer and social
service employee); Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d 75, 84-85 (5th Cir. 2004) (applying Crawford's
three definitions to the admissibility of accomplice's statements to another individual in a private
conversation).
53 For a variety of reasons, this Note believes that merely applying all three definitions to the
most common hearsay statements in the child abuse context is insufficient for the reader. First, by
simply using all three definitions to determine whether a statement is testimonial, seems intui-
tively boundless and standardless. Nowhere in Crawford did the Court allude to the fact that all
three definitions should govern whether a statement is testimonial. In fact, it is likely true that a
particular statement in a given case could be admissible under one definition, but inadmissible
under one of the other formulations. As a practical matter, it is hard to argue whether certain out-
of-court statements are testimonial when there is no real working definition. Secondly, one pur-
pose of this Note is to provide both prosecutors and defense attorneys with guidance on this issue.
It is fairly obvious that this Note would provide little guidance to either if this Note fails to pro-
vide a tangible definition of what constitutes these kinds of statements. However, this being said,
it is not the purpose of this Note to address in extensive and great detail why one testimonial for-
mulation is better than the other. In fact, one could conceivably write an entire note specifically
addressing the proper definition of an out-of-court testimonial statement. Instead, this Note, after
reading and analyzing a significant amount of research among the various scholars who have
specifically dealt with this important issue, will briefly explain which testimonial formulation is
most appropriate and consistent with the Framers understanding of the purposes for a defendants'
Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation.
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single, workable definition of an out-of-court testimonial statement that will
provide definitive guidance to prosecutors when confronting a post-Crawford
Confrontation Clause issue in the child abuse context.
For a variety of reasons, this Note believes that the proper definition of
an out-of-court testimonial statement is articulated in both the first and third
formulation cited above. First, it should be observed that, arguably, the first and
third definitions essentially advocate the same formula for determining whether
a declaration constitutes an out-of-court testimonial statement. The first defini-
tion, while laying out some specific examples of traditional testimonial state-
ments, proposes that all testimonial declarations are ultimately those pretrial
statements that "declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutori-
ally. '' 54 Similarly, the third definition recommends that testimonial declarations
be defined as those "statements that were made under circumstances that would
lead an objective witness to reasonably believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial. 55 Basically, these are the same definitions
phrased in slightly different terminology. Ultimately, both definitions focus on
a reasonable or objective witness test, and simply ask: Under the circumstances,
would an objective declarant reasonably believe that his or her out-of-court ut-
terances could be used at a later trial proceeding?
56
Because the first and third definitions are functionally equivalent, this
Note will first address why the second proposed testimonial definition is insuffi-
cient for Confrontation Clause purposes. Professor Richard Friedman, author of
an amicus brief in Crawford and who has advocated a testimonial approach for
years, provides an excellent analysis for why the second formulation iterated by
Justice Thomas in White v. Illinois is inadequate for Confrontation Clause pur-
poses. Friedman contends that a historical review of the Confrontation Clause
demonstrates that Justice Thomas's proposed testimonial approach is unsatisfac-
tory. 57 Specifically, Friedman claims that Justice Thomas's testimonial defini-
54 See supra note 49.
55 See supra note 51.
56 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in applying Crawford, has also stated that a combina-
tion of these two formulations is the proper definition of a testimonial statement. In United States
v. Saget, after a lengthy discussion of the Crawford decision, the Second Circuit observed, "Craw-
ford at least suggests that the determinative factor in determining whether a declarant bears testi-
mony is the declarant's awareness or expectation that his or her statements may later be used at a
trial." United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004). The Court in Saget further elabo-
rated on Crawford's testimonial framework, "[a]ll of these (testimonial) definitions provide that
the statement may be such that the declarant reasonably expects that the statement might be used
in future judicial proceedings. Although the (Crawford) Court did not adopt any of these formula-
tions, its statement that 'these formulations all share a common nucleus and then define the
Clause's coverage at various levels of abstraction around it' suggests that the Court would use the
reasonable expectation of the declarant as the anchor of a more concrete definition of testimony."
Id. at 229 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)).
57 To reiterate, Justice Thomas's proposal in White for a definition of a testimonial declaration
is limited to "extradjudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions." See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. It is im-
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tion errs by concentrating solely on whether the statement was made in a for-
malized setting with the police or another government agent involved in the
case.
Formalities such as oath are not necessary to render a statement
testimonial.. .Indeed, such a theory is profoundly ahistorical.
Even as late as the eighteenth century, most prosecutions were
private lawsuits . . . [However], [t]he right of the accused to
confront his accusers [did] not lose force in a system in which
an accuser rather than the State is the adverse party.58
Thus, according to Friedman, Justice Thomas's formalized, govern-
ment-involved approach to testimonial statements does not square with the his-
torical time period in which the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause was
written, a time period when the prosecution of crimes usually did not include
any formalized government participation.59 Professor Friedman also argues that
Justice Thomas's approach of limiting testimonial statements to government-
involved, formalized declarations could be easily evaded. 60 Friedman provides
specific examples of situations where a possible witness could eviscerate Craw-
ford by merely making statements outside the presence of government officials
portant to note that Justice Thomas's position that a testimonial statement should be restricted to
formalized testimonial materials, including depositions, affidavits, prior testimony, and defen-
dants' confessions in the custody of police, has also been advocated by other academics, too. See,
e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply to Professor Friedman, 86
GEO. L.J. 1045, 1046 (1998) (arguing that the Confrontation Clause should be limited to covering
"government-prepared affidavits and depositions" and "[p]olice station confessions and state-
ments"); Margaret A. Berger, The De-Constitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A Pro-
posal for a Prosecutorial Restrain Model, 76 MINN. L. REv. 557, 561 (stating the Confrontation
Clause should be implicated and mainly concerned with statements made to a government official,
including the police or prosecution).
58 Dial-In Testimony, supra note 29, n. 295 (citing JOHN M. BEATTIE CRIME AND THE COURTS
IN ENGLAND, 1660-1800 35-36 (1986)). According to the eminent historian Beattie, it was not
until the nineteenth century (long after the Constitution was written in America) that professional
police forces and the government took over the prosecution of criminal cases. Before then, crimi-
nal matters were largely pursued by the private initiative of the victim alone, without any partici-
pation from the State.
59 If the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause was ratified in an era when government
involvement in the prosecution of crimes did not exist, then it is safe to say that the Framers
would not have mandated that the Confrontation Clause could only be implicated in the very few
instances when the government actually participated and initiated proceedings against a defendant.
However, despite Professor Friedman's assertions about the original meaning of the Confrontation
Clause, there are other competing historical accounts of the Clause that tend to buttress Justice
Thomas's approach. As will be discussed later, this Note believes these competing accounts may
be more historically correct.
60 Adjusting to Crawford, supra note 6, at 9 (explaining how this approach, unlike Justice
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with the intention that the hearer of the statement would then go to the authori-
ties with such a statement.
61
Finally, Professor Friedman provides exceptional insight on why the
first and third definitions capture the true essence of what the Confrontation
Clause seeks to provide for a defendant. He states, "I believe the third of these
is the most useful and accurate. It captures the idea that the Confrontation
Clause is meant to prevent the creation of a system in which witnesses can offer
their testimony without being subjected to cross-examination." 62 Friedman con-
tinues,
[t]he confrontation right, as I conceive it, applies only to testi-
monial statements, the type of statement that makes a person a
witness. Thus, a statement made in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, including conspiratorial business, would not be a testimo-
nial statement, and so would not invoke the confrontation right.
But a statement describing a crime and knowingly made to au-
thorities, or to an intermediary designated to convey the state-
ment to the authorities, would be a testimonial one.63
It is questionable whether Professor Friedman is correct in his conten-
tion that Justice Thomas's formalized definition of a "testimonial" statement
does not square with the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause. First, it
should be noted that most scholars agree that the history of the Confrontation
Clause is fairly ambiguous. 64 Thus, any definitive answer as to whether Justice
61 Dial-In Testimony, supra note 29, at 1247. Friedman states,
Indeed, if formality was necessary to bring a statement with the Confrontation
Clause, perverse incentives would arise. The government, or others interested
in the creation of prosecution evidence, would have an incentive to encourage
the making of statements-such as 911 calls-lacking formalities such as the
oath, because the avoidance of such formalities would ensure that the state-
ment would not be covered by the Confrontation Clause.
62 Adjusting to Crawford, supra note 6, at 9. While this Note greatly respects the wisdom and
acumen of Professor Friedman, this Note does not believe that there are any real, practical differ-
ences between the first and third definitions. Therefore, in the opinion of this Note, Professor
Friedman's statements advocating the third definition simply serves the broader proposition that
the best testimonial definition is: whether a reasonable, objective declarant would have thought his
or her out-of-court utterance could be used at a later trial?
63 Richard D. Friedman, The Confrontation as a Hot Topic: The Virtues of Going Back to
Square One, 21 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 1041, 1043 (2003).
64 See John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-
Examination, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 191, 234 (1999). Ac-
cording to Professor Douglass, "[miost discussions of the history of the Confrontation Clause
begin with disclaimers." See also Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Con-
frontation Clause: A Proposal For a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REv. 557, 568
(1992) (stating that the "Clause was barely debated while the Sixth Amendment was under con-
sideration, and American documents predating the Sixth Amendment rarely discussed the purpose
of confrontation"). Even Professor Friedman concedes the trouble in pinning down the history of
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Thomas or Professor Friedman is categorically correct in their historical inter-
pretation of the Clause is likely unattainable. However, this being said, a brief
look at the historical context in which this fundamental right developed in the
United States demonstrates that Justice Thomas's proposed "testimonial" defini-
tion may actually be more historically accurate.
While the right to confrontation had a tumultuous past in England,6 5
criminal defendants there were practically guaranteed this right at all trials by
the 1730's.66 However, in colonial America at this same time, colonists were
frequently denied the right to confrontation in those crimes in which the English
government had jurisdiction to prosecute.67 Instead, the English government
conducted private, ex parte depositions or interrogatories of witnesses and sim-
ply had this sworn, written testimony read in at trial against the defendant. In
these situations, a colonial defendant lacked the ability to confront the witness
or his adverse testimony at trial. In response to this method being used against
the colonists, it is not surprising that around the time of the American Revolu-
tion many colonies that drafted a constitution or declaration of rights included a
right to confrontation.68 Eventually, this fundamental right would also be
adopted into the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution.69 In light
the Clause. Richard Friedman, Confrontation: The Search For Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J.
1011, 1023 (1998) (claiming, "The origins of the Clause are famously obscure.").
65 See Douglass, supra note 64, at 234-37 (tracing the turbulent history of the right to confron-
tation in England) See also Natalie Kijurna, Lily v. Virginia: The Confrontation Clause and Hear-
say-"Oh What a Tangled Web We Weave ... " 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133, 1138-40 (1991) (ex-
amining the rise, fall, and subsequent rise of the right in English history).
66 Berger, supra note 64, at 577 (citing John H. Langbeign, The Criminal Trial Before Law-
yers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 311 (1978)) (stating "from the 1730's on defense counsel were in-
creasingly allowed to examine and cross-examine witnesses").
67 See Berger, supra note 64, at 579. One major example of the English denying the colonists
in America their right to confrontation was in 1765 when the English enlarged the vice-admiralty
courts' jurisdiction to try all Stamp Act offenses that were allegedly committed by the colonists.
At the time, vice-admiralty courts utilized the continental civil law system over the common law
procedure and had all potential witnesses to a crime answer questions in private, ex parte inter-
rogatories. Thus, the result of the English enlarging the courts' jurisdiction effectively deprived
the accused in all Stamp Act offenses the ability to confront witnesses against him. See also Murl
A. Larkin, Right of Confrontation: What Next?, I TEx. TECH. L. REV. 67, 71-72 (1969) (explain-
ing that soon after the Stamp Act, the English Parliament also passed legislation that all alleged
traitors in the colonies would be sent to England and be tried for treason. This legislation had the
practical effect of depriving the accused the right to confrontation because the Crown's evidence
would be collected in the colonies through ex parte depositions and interrogatories of witnesses
and would then be presented in written form against the accused at trial in England without per-
mitting the accused the right to confront the witness or his testimony).
68 Larkin, supra note 67, at 75-76. See also Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation
Clause, 54 S.C. L. REv. 537, 551 (2003). By 1784, eight of the thirteen colonies, including Vir-
ginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania had codified the right to confrontation in their respective
founding documents.
69 Larkin, supra note 67, at 76. On June 8, 1789, James Madison of Virginia initially proposed
a constitutional amendment, including the right to confrontation, to the House of Representatives.
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of this history, Justice Thomas's testimonial definition only activating the Con-
frontation Clause when "extrajudicial statements ...contained in formalized
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confes-
sions" are at issue, appears to be more historically accurate. As one scholar has
put it, "History, then, permits one reasonably safe conclusion: the Clause was
intended-at least in part-to prohibit trials by ex parte affidavit or deposition
when a court denied an accused any opportunity to challenge his accusers face-
to-face.,
70
Nevertheless, despite Justice Thomas's historically accurate assertion
that the Founding era generation most likely envisioned the right to confronta-
tion as a method of preventing the use of ex pane, formalized statements at trial
against the accused, a strong argument can be made that the Confrontation
Clause should not be limited to only these statements. Professor Friedman is
eminently correct that Justice Thomas's view in practice could easily be evaded,
intentionally or otherwise, by potential witnesses. A small illustration proves
this point.71 Scenario 1: A victim of a crime makes incriminating statements
about the accused to a friend or relative with the sole intention that they would
pass this information onto the police. Scenario 2: This same victim goes directly
to the police but makes the identical statements in a sworn affidavit. In reality,
there is no real difference between either of these scenarios because they effec-
tively serve the exact same purpose: the victim is making inculpating statements
about the accused. However, under Justice Thomas's more restrictive view, the
victim's statements in the first scenario would avoid Confrontation Clause scru-
tiny because there is no formality surrounding the victim's statement nor is the
government participating in procuring the statement. While in the second sce-
nario, Justice Thomas would implicate the Confrontation Clause simply because
the statements were procured in a formalized manner through an affidavit. The
Confrontation Clause should be interpreted in a manner that avoids this illogical
conclusion. A testimonial approach, disregarding formalities and implicating
the Confrontation Clause anytime an objective declarant makes a statement that
he or she reasonably believes could be used against the defendant at trial, would
be effective way that avoids this nonsensical result. Applying this approach to
the scenarios above, the Confrontation Clause would be implicated in both be-
Less than two years later, on December 15, 1791, the First Congress would debate the right for a
mere five minutes and subsequently adopted the right without much disapproval.
70 Douglass, supra note 64, at 236. The Crawford majority also acknowledged Justice Tho-
mas's assertion of the historical purposes of the Clause. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49 (stating
"[tihe principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was the civil law mode of
criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the ac-
cused").
71 This is a simple example of how Justice Thomas's approach could be easily evaded. Pro-
fessor Friedman provides similar examples demonstrating how Justice Thomas's approach would
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cause in either case the victim would have reasonably believed that his or her
statements could be used against the accused at a potential trial. Therefore, in
conclusion, this Note suggests that this approach, encompassing both the first
and third testimonial definitions in Crawford, would function best in practice.
B. Applying the Testimonial Approach to Those Child Declarants Who are
Unavailable at Trial Because They are Deemed Incompetent to Testify
As with other areas of law,72 because children lack the maturity or men-
tal capacity that is incorporated into a reasonable person (or declarant) standard,
it is sometimes difficult to ascertain what a reasonable, objective child would
think or believe in a given circumstance. Thus, the testimonial definition that
asks, "under the circumstances, would an objective declarant reasonably believe
that his or her out-of-court utterances could be used at a later trial proceeding"
arguably poses a great amount of difficulty in its application with regards to
potential child declarants in a child abuse prosecution.73 While these potential
problems will be explored later in this Note, one situation where arguably the
testimonial definition should not govern is where a court finds that a child is
incompetent to testify at trial because he or she lacks the requisite mental capac-
ity.
Generally speaking, over the years, the federal system and most states
have prescribed through their various Rules of Evidence and the common law
that the competency of an individual, adult or child, to testify at trial is largely
within the discretion of a trial judge.74 Specifically, in the child witness context,
a trial court usually conducts a detailed inquiry, sometimes calling expert wit-
nesses, to assess whether the child is legally competent to testify at the trial pro-
72 For example, in the area of negligence in tort law, some states have applied the so-called
Minority Rule of Seven. Under this doctrine, children under the age of seven cannot be found
negligent because it is thought that children of this young age cannot be subjected to the reason-
able person standard. Furthermore, for children between the age of seven and fourteen, there is a
presumption that they cannot be found negligent, which must be rebutted by the plaintiff. Finally,
all remaining children over the age of fourteen are presumptively capable of committing a negli-
gent act. See DOMINICK VETRI, ET AL., TORT LAW & PRACTICE, at 90 (discussing this concept). See
also Kuhns v. Brugger, 135 A.2d 395, 401 (Pa. 1957) (dividing children into these three catego-
ries for negligence purposes).
73 Professor Friedman also asserts that this testimonial definition will present problems for
child declarants. See Adjusting to Crawford, supra note 6, at 10 (claiming that "[a]nother type of
case that will frequently test the limits of the term "testimonial" involves statements by children,
typically alleging some kind of abuse. Children's statements raised some of the most difficult
questions under Roberts, and they will continue to do so under Crawford').
74 FED. R. EvID. 601 states that "[e]very person is competent to be a witness except as other-
wise provided by these rules." See, e.g., United States v. Comer, 421 F.2d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(stating that a child's competency is left to the sound discretion of a trial judge); State v. Ayers,
369 S.E.2d 22, 27 (W. Va. 1988) (quoting State v. Wilson, 207 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va. 1974)) (ex-
plaining that "[the question of the competency of a witness to testify is left largely to the discre-
tion of the trial court and its judgment will not be disturbed unless shown to have been plainly
abused resulting in manifest error").
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ceeding.75 Ultimately, there are various factors a trial judge will consider in
determining whether a child is competent to testify. A trial court looks to
whether the child knows and perceives the differences between truth and falsity
and right and wrong and whether he or she understands the results of falsely
testifying under oath.76 Furthermore, a court often assesses whether the child
has the requisite intelligence and mental capacity to understand, recall, and nar-
rate his impressions of the event in question that will be the subject of his testi-
mony.77 Finally, a court can even assess the various psychiatric and psychologi-
cal characteristics of the child to determine whether the child's testimony could
be credible.78 In sum, a trial judge has complete discretion to look at the totality
of the circumstances and evaluate, whether in his or her judgment, a child is
competent and fit to testify at the subsequent proceeding.
In response to the potential problem of a court finding an allegedly
abused child incompetent to testify against the defendant at trial, the federal
government and many states have provided added protections for children that
enable a trial court to more likely find an abused child competent to give testi-
mony. In 1996, the federal government passed the Victims' Protection and
Rights Act, an elaborate statutory scheme that places a heavy burden on any
party seeking to have a court declare an allegedly abused child incompetent to
testify. 79 Specifically, this federal statute provides that children are to be pre-
sumed competent to testify at trial and that a competency evaluation of the child
can only be conducted if compelling reasons exist and a party offers a written
motion and offer of proof demonstrating the child's incompetency. 80 Moreover,
75 See, e.g., State v. Stacy, 371 S.E.2d 614, 619 (W. Va. 1988) (holding that a trial court erred
in a child abuse prosecution when the trial court refused to grant the defendant's motion to have
the 5-year-old victim to be evaluated by an independent psychiatrist to make a determination of
whether the child was competent to testify).
76 See Ayers, 369 S.E.2d at 26 (explaining that in assessing a child's competency, "[tihe first,
more traditional, challenge concerns the child's ability to perceive the distinction between truth
and falsity as well as the consequences of falsely testifying under oath."); State v. Gordon, 342
S.E.2d 509, 512 (N.C. 1986) (discussing that a child witness was competent to testify in part be-
cause she "showed a general knowledge of the difference between right and wrong."); Doran v.
United States, 205 F.2d 717, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (holding that "[b]efore passing on competency,
the court may resort to any examination which might disclose whether the child understands and
appreciates the difference between right and wrong .... ).
77 See United States v. Perez, 526 F.2d 859, 865 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that the appropriate
test in determining the competence of young child is whether he has the requisite capacity to
understand, recall, and narrate his impressions of an occurrence). See also State v. Frazier, 574
N.E.2d 483, 487 (Ohio 1991) (holding for a competency determination, a trial judge "should
determine through questioning whether the child of tender years is capable of receiving just im-
pressions of facts and events and to accurately relate them").
78 See Ayers, 369 S.E.2d at 26 (holding that a trial judge can assess "[w]hether the child, due to
various psychological factors, is so inherently incredible as to require an additional psychiatric
evaluation to whether the child may testify").
79 See 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2000).
80 Id. § 3509(c)(2-4).
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according to the statute, even if a party successfully obtains a competency hear-
ing, the hearing may only focus on whether the child has an ability to under-
stand and answer simple questions.8' Similar to the federal statute, a number of
states have also enacted legislation making it easier for an abused child to be
competent to testify at trial. In fact, some states have even gone so far as to
statutorily mandate that an alleged child abuse victim should be allowed to tes-
tify either without any prior judicial examination, or a child should not be de-
clared incompetent to testify even if the child does not understand the obligation
of the oath.82
Nevertheless, despite the federal government and some states adopting
less stringent standards for admitting the testimony of child victims at trial, there
is still great concern among many prosecutors that a successful prosecution of
child abuse can be nullified when the child victim, who is often the only witness
to the crime, is declared incompetent to testify at trial.83 Prior to Crawford,
when the child witness was declared incompetent, the prosecution would at-
tempt to introduce some of the child's out-of-court statements through the vari-
ous hearsay exceptions, which often made prosecution of child abuse somewhat
difficult. After Crawford and its implementation of the testimonial standard to
govern hearsay statements, potential child abuse prosecutions may be more
challenging. Crawford requires that if an out-of-court statement is deemed tes-
timonial, the Confrontation Clause bars the introduction of such a hearsay
statement at trial unless the defendant has an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. 84 Consequently, in a post-Crawford child abuse prosecution, once an
allegedly abused child is declared incompetent and thus unavailable to testify, a
prosecutor's ability to introduce a child's out-of-court testimonial statements
vanishes. Therefore, on its face, it would appear the ultimate inquiry is whether
the child's particular utterances were testimonial in nature.
However, it stands to reason that if a trial court were to find an allegedly
abused child incompetent to testify at trial, then logically that same child could
81 Id. § 3509(c)(8).
82 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-410 ("A child victim of sexual abuse under the age of ten
is a competent witness and shall be allowed to testify without prior qualification in any judicial
proceeding. The trier of fact shall determine the weight and credibility of the testimony."); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4302 ("No child under the age of 10 years may be excluded from giving
testimony for the sole reason that such child does not understand the obligation of an oath. Such
child's age and degree of understanding the obligation of an oath may be considered by the trier of
fact in judging the child's credibility.").
83 See, e.g., Ayers, 369 S.E.2d at 25 (stating that "[o]ften a child in an abuse proceeding is the
only potential witness. Thus, the problem confronting any court at the outset of an abuse proceed-
ing is whether the child is competent to testify .... Therefore, we understand a trial court's con-
cern to determine that a child is a competent witness before she is allowed to be the prime ac-
cuser").
84 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
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not have made an out-of-court testimonial statement in the first place. As this
Note has previously argued, a testimonial statement is any out-of-court state-
ment that, given the specific circumstances, an objective declarant would rea-
sonably expect and believe could later be used in court. Subsumed in this rea-
sonable, objective declarant, would likely be the declarant's ability to accurately
and truthfully perceive and recount information, the declarant's knowledge of
right and wrong, and the declarant's overall mental capacity to objectively know
the consequences of his or her utterances.86 Similarly, when a court determines
whether a child is competent to testify, the court looks at equivalent factors in-
cluding whether the child knows and perceives the difference between truth and
falsity, right and wrong, and whether the child has the overall requisite intelli-
85 This Note concedes that it is theoretically possible for a child to have the requisite mental
capacity to make an out-of-court testimonial statement and then subsequently lose that mental
capacity to testify at trial. For example, a child could be mentally competent when he made the
testimonial statement and then some intervening factor, internally or externally, could possibly
cause this same child to lack the requisite mental capability to testify at a future trial proceeding.
However, this would appear to be an exception not the rule. In fact, most likely, based on the
maturation of a child, the reverse would likely be true. Given the time sequence alone, a typical
child would more likely have a greater probability of possessing the mental capacity to testify at a
later trial than have the required mental capacity to make a testimonial statement at an earlier time
period.
86 Some may argue that this Note is assuming too much for an objective declarant standard
who must reasonably believe his or her statement would be used at a later trial. Further, some will
argue that by engrafting whether a child could make a proper testimonial statement onto a trial
court's competency determination of that same child will water down Crawford and the Confron-
tation Clause to a mere evidentiary finding. This Note disagrees. If the testimonial definition
means anything and specifically requires that the objective declarant reasonably would have
known the consequences of his or her statements, then, at a bare minimum, one would assume that
this declarant would have an average mental capacity to recount and recall information in an accu-
rate, functionally effective manner. Furthermore, in many other areas of law, the law assumes
things about the supposed reasonable, objective person. For example, in the tort of negligence,
the law presumes in the reasonable person standard that the person has a normal intellect, mem-
ory, and perception. Thus, when judging whether a person fell below the standard of care, a court
looks to whether the individual defendant has met these threshold and baseline capabilities. Simi-
larly, in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court has assumed cer-
tain qualities and characteristics of the reasonable person in judging whether this person would
believe that a religious display or depiction demonstrated an endorsement of religion. See, e.g.,
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995). In Capitol Square, Jus-
tice O'Connor stated the Establishment Clause test that "[w]hen the reasonable observer would
view a government practice as endorsing religion, I believe that it is our duty to hold the practice
invalid." Id. at 777 (O'Connor, J., Souter, J. & Breyer, J., concurring). However, in assessing the
reasonable observer, O'Connor acknowledged that the "reasonable observer.., must be deemed
aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious display ap-
pears." Id. at 780. (O'Connor, J., Souter, J. & Breyer, J., concurring). Therefore, the suggestion
that one is assuming too much with the reasonable declarant appears to be contrary to the applica-
tion of similar reasonable person standards in other areas of law. As stated above, it would be
highly improbable that an individual could have the mental capacity and ability to understand the
full consequences of his or her utterance to make an out-of-court testimonial statement, but the
same declarant would lack this similar capacity in comprehending the consequences and overall
nature of his or her testimony at the future trial.
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gence and mental capacity to understand, recall, and narrate his impressions of
the event that will be the subject of the child's testimony. Because the objec-
tive, reasonable declarant and a competent individual likely possess the same
characteristics, 87 it is doubtful whether a trial court could find, on one hand, that
a child is incompetent to testify at trial but, on the other hand, that the same
child at an earlier time could make a testimonial statement which he reasonably
believed could be used at a future trial. Stated another way, it would be very
unlikely that a trial court could find that a child somehow possessed the requi-
site mental competency to reasonably believe and realize the potential conse-
quences his or her out-of-court statement, and thus qualify it as a testimonial
statement. But at the future trial, the child would suddenly lack these similar
mental capacities and qualities necessary for the child to be competent to testify.
Therefore, arguably in this narrow context, when a child is found to be incompe-
tent to testify at trial because he or she lacks the requisite mental capacity then,
ipso facto, that same child could not make an out-of-court testimonial statement
in a previous circumstance.
88
V. APPLYING CRAWFORD'S TESTIMONIAL APPROACH TO THE MOST COMMON
HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS USED IN A CHILD ABUSE PROSECUTION
A. Federal Rules of Evidence 803(2): Excited Utterance or a State's Func-
tional Equivalent
Prior to Crawford, many prosecutors in child abuse cases would use
hearsay exceptions in attempt to get an unavailable, allegedly abused child's
87 It should not be surprising that this reasonable, objective declarant, for testimonial purposes,
would possess similar qualities as an individual who is found by a court to be competent to testify
at trial. As the Court in Crawford noted, "[tihe text of the Confrontation Clause ... applies to
witnesses against the accused-in other words, those who bear testimony. Testimony, in turn, is
typically a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some
fact." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (internal citations omitted). Consequently,
the definition of "testimonial" in Crawford is derived from the idea of someone who is bearing
some kind of testimony, which is exactly what an individual does when he or she testifies at trial
once he or she is found competent and capable of doing so.
88 It is important to note that this is a limited context when this particular situation could arise.
Only when the child declarant lacks the requisite mental capacity to know the difference between
truth and falsity, reality and fantasy should this concept apply. Outside of this limited situation,
there are many other examples when a child declarant could be found incompetent to testify at
trial and this idea would not be applicable. For example, a child could be declared incompetent to
testify when he or she has difficulty conveying her testimony on the witness stand because the
child is emotionally upset about the past incident, or the child has psychological problems when
he or she is around the accused. In this scenario, the child would be incompetent to testify not
because she lacks the mental capacity to know the difference between truth and falsehood, but
because of emotional or psychological problems that have inhibited her mental capacity. Here,
because the problems are created by external stimuli, it is doubtful that he or she would have
lacked the mental capacity to make a testimonial statement at an earlier time period.
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out-of-court statements admitted at trial.89 In the months following Crawford,
prosecutors have continued to rely on a variety of these hearsay exceptions in
child abuse prosecutions. One of the most frequently used hearsay exceptions
that prosecutors depend upon in the child abuse context is the so-called excited
utterance exception. 90 The foundation underlying the excited utterance hearsay
exception is that the statement, even though made out-of-court and not subject
to cross-examination, is most likely reliable because the statement is made un-
der such excited, spontaneous circumstances that the declarant's ability to fabri-
cate is de minimis.9' In order to qualify and be admitted under the excited utter-
ance hearsay exception, the offering party must prove: "(1) a startling event
occurred; (2) the declarant made the statement while under the stress of excite-
ment caused by the startling event; and (3) the declarant's statement related to
the startling event. '92 Ultimately, a trial judge will make a factual determination
about each of these conditions to determine whether the particular out-of-court
statement at issue qualifies under the excited utterance hearsay exception.
In the brief period of time that has elapsed since Crawford, many prose-
cutors and courts across the country have struggled in determining whether a
statement that is sufficient to qualify under the excited utterance hearsay excep-
tion should nevertheless be held inadmissible when the declarant does not testify
and the statement is found to be testimonial. Specifically, many courts have had
to decide whether an out-of-court statement made under such spontaneous and
startling conditions as to meet the criteria for an excited utterance could also
89 See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 350 (1992). In White, the prosecution used the
hearsay exceptions of spontaneous declaration and statements made during the course of a medi-
cal treatment to successfully introduce a number of out-of-court statements made by an allegedly
abused child who was unavailable to testify at trial. Id. See also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805,
812 (1990). In Wright, the prosecution attempted to admit an allegedly abused child's out-of-
court statements at trial through Idaho's residual hearsay exception. However, the United States
Supreme Court rejected the prosecution's argument because the statement was found to lack the
requisite particularized guarantees of trustworthiness that was required by the pre-Crawford con-
frontation clause framework. Id. at 827.
90 The excited utterance hearsay exception is codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence under
Rule 803(2). This type of out-of-court statement is defined as "[a] statement relating to a startling
event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition." FED. R. EviD. 803(2). It should be noted that practically all of the fifty states
also have the excited utterance exception under their particular state rules of evidence. See, e.g.,
W. VA. R. EvlD 803(2).
91 See FED. R. EviD. 803(2) advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee acknowl-
edged that "[t]he theory of Exception (2) is simply that circumstances may produce a condition of
excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of
conscious fabrication." See also United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing
United States v. Joy, 192 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 1999), cert denied 530 U.S. 1250 (2000)) (stat-
ing that "[tihe rationale for the excited utterance exception lies in the notion that excitement sus-
pends the declarant's powers of reflection and fabrication, consequently minimizing the possibil-
ity that the utterance will be influenced by self interest and therefore rendered unreliable").
92 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE MANUAL STUDENT
EDMON § 16-7 (6th ed. 2003).
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simultaneously constitute a testimonial declaration for Crawford purposes.93 As
mentioned before, if the statement is found by the court to be non-testimonial
then the statement would most likely be admissible, as the Robert's regime
would govern, and the excited utterance hearsay exception almost always has
been found to be a firmly rooted hearsay exception.94 Therefore, in the child
abuse context, the inquiry into whether an excited utterance is also testimonial
for Crawford purposes is critical to prosecutors and defense attorneys and will
likely dispositive on whether an allegedly abused child's out-of-court statements
will be admissible at trial.
A strong argument can be made that most excited utterances will not
also qualify as testimonial for Crawford purposes. It seems facially illogical
that a statement made under such startling and excited circumstances that the
individual had no time to reflect or fabricate could also simulateneously qualify
as a testimonial statement in which the declarant reasonably and consciously
believed that his or her statement could be used at trial. In other words, if the
statement was made under circumstances where the declarant couldn't reflect or
fabricate, as is required for an excited utterance, then it is highly unlikely that
the declarant could somehow also have the capacity to realize and believe that
his statement could be used at future judicial proceeding. In fact, at least one
state appellate court has categorically questioned whether any statement that is
sufficient to qualify as an excited utterance could also ever be characterized as a
testimonial statement.95 While most courts have not gone as far to definitively
conclude that all excited utterances are always non-testimonial statements, most
courts have decided that such statements are non-testimonial for the purposes of
Crawford.96 Therefore, in most circumstances, if the prosecution is successfully
93 See, e.g., State v. Ferguson, 609 S.E.2d 526 (W. Va. 2004) (holding that statements qualify-
ing under the excited utterance hearsay exception were non-testimonial under Crawford). But see
Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 697-700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that out-of-court
statements that were sufficient to constitute an excited utterance were inadmissible because the
statements in question were testimonial for Crawford purposes).
94 See, e.g. State v. Bryant, 38 P.3d 661, 665 (Ka. 2002) (quoting State v. Deal, 23 P.3d 840,
853 (Ka. 2002)) (stating, "The excited utterance exception is a firmly rooted hearsay exception.").
As the Court in Crawford specifically stated, "[w]here nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is
wholly consistent with the Framers' design to afford the States flexibility in their development of
hearsay law-as does Roberts .... "Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
95 See Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945, 952-953 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that "[wie
further note that the very concept of an "excited utterance" is such that it is difficult to perceive
how such a statement could ever be testimonial .... An unrehearsed statement without time for
reflection or deliberation, as required to be an "excited utterance" is not "testimonial" in that such
a statement, by definition, has been not been made in contemplation of its use in a future trial.")
But see Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 697-700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (claiming that "[i]n our
view, the findings necessary to support a conclusion that a statement was an excited utterance do
not conflict with those that are necessary to support a conclusion that it was testimonial").
96 See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that an alleg-
edly abused child's out-of-court statements to his father immediately after the incident had oc-
curred constituted as an excited utterance and were non-testimonial under Crawford); People v.
Bryant, 2004 WL 1882661 at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004) (holding that a victim's state-
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able to argue that the out-of-court statements in question constitute excited ut-
terances, it is doubtful that such statements would also be testimonial and impli-
cate Crawford.97
B. Federal Rules of Evidence 803(4): Statements For Purposes of Medical
Diagnosis or Treatment or a State's Functional Equivalent
Another commonly used hearsay exception in a child abuse prosecution
is the statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.98 The
underlying rationale for allowing these out-of-court statements to be admissible
at trial is that a declarant who is undergoing some type of medical examination
has the motivation to be truthful and honest to his or her physician because the
physician's successful treatment of the declarant mainly turns upon the accuracy
of the declarant's statements to the physician.99 Thus, because the declarant's
ments inculpating the defendant that were made right after he was allegedly shot by the defendant
were admissible at trial because the statements constituted as excited utterances and were non-
testimonial); People v. Caudillo, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 574, 583-90 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (deciding that
a 911 call made by an anonymous witness to a crime came within the excited utterance hearsay
exception and was also non-testimonial because "[t]he details provided by the caller were elicited
in order to facilitate appropriate police response, not to provide evidence to be used at a later
trial.") (emphasis added).
97 However, one instance in which this general proposition may not be as clear cut is when the
prosecution attempts to introduce an alleged abused child's out-of-court excited utterances that
were made to a police officer or other government actor. While the conclusive definition of a
testimonial statement was left open in Crawford, one kind of out-of-court statement that Crawford
clearly and emphatically barred was those out-of-court statements made to the police during an
interrogation. As the Court stated in Crawford, "[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course
of interrogations are also testimonial even under a narrow standard." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
Therefore, one could conceive of an allegedly abused child responding to a police officer's ques-
tions about the alleged abuse right after the abuse occurred and the police had arrived on the
scene. Because the government actor would be the recipient and most likely the facilitator of such
statements made by the child, Crawford could potentially bar the introduction of such statements.
The involvement of governmental actors, including police officers, in the child abuse context and
determining what actually constitutes interrogation to implicate Crawford will be further dis-
cussed later in this Note. At this point, it is sufficient to say that it is conceivable to find some
out-of-court statements that would constitute as both excited utterances and testimonial declara-
tions. But see, State v. Anderson, 2005 WL 171441 at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 20, 2005)
(holding that a witness's statement to a police officer, which constituted as an excited utterance,
was non-testimonial and thus did not trigger Crawford).
98 See, e.g., State v. Reese 2004 WL 1732460 (Wash Ct. App. August 3, 2004); State v.
Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022 (R.I. 2004). Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treat-
ment is codified in Rule 803(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The rule states that
"[s]tatements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history,
or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception of general character of the cause
or external source thereof as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" are admissible even
though the declarant is available as a witness. FED. R. EviD. 803(4). See also W. VA. R. EvID.
803(4).
99 See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, §16-18 (explaining that "[t]he reliability of state-
ments made for the purpose of medical treatment is ensured by the declarant's motive to be truth-
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own self-interest in being treated properly encourages him or her to be truthful,
courts will likely find that these kinds of out-of-court declarations are suffi-
ciently reliable to be admissible at trial. Some jurisdictions have held admissi-
ble the introduction of such statements at trial when those statements are made
to hospital attendants, ambulance drivers, or a declarant's family member, so
long as the particular statements were made in order to obtain some kind of
medical treatment.1°° Furthermore, several courts have found statements made
by parents to a child's physician on behalf of the injured child to be admissible
because it is assumed that a parent would not lie to their child's physician re-
garding the child's injury.'' Ultimately, to meet this exception, the inquiry
hinges upon whether the declarant made the statement for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment and whether the treating doctor usually relies upon such
statements when performing treatment on the declarant.10 2 If the declarant's
statements were merely made for accusatory or non-medical purposes then the
declarant's conversations with a treating physician would most likely not fall
under the exception and no Crawford testimonial analysis would be neces-
sary. 
103
A variety of courts throughout the country have begun to analyze the ef-
fects, if any, that Crawford may pose in a child abuse prosecution when the al-
legedly abused child made the particular out-of-court statements for the purpose
of medical diagnosis or treatment. However, at this time, no consensus among
the courts has emerged in whether such statements also qualify as testimonial
While some courts have found that the statement is testimonial when the exami-
nation appears to be a part of the police investigative process, other courts have
found that even under these circumstances, a child's statement to his doctor can
ful since treatment hinges largely on the accuracy of the information imparted to the physician or
other person involved in providing medical care").
100 See FED R. Evil. 803(4) advisory committee's note. According to the Advisory Committee,
"[u]nder the exception the statement need not have been made to a physician. Statements to hos-
pital attendants, ambulance drivers, or even members of the family might be included."
101 See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 16-18 (stating that "[in the case of a child, a
court would undoubtedly assume the absence of any motive to mislead on the part of parents").
See, e.g., United States v. Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807, 812-814 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a mother's
letter to a physician that her son was being sexually abused by his step-father was admissible
under the medial treatment exception).
102 See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 92, § 16-20.
103 See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022 (R.I. 2004). In Lynch, a 16-year-old made state-
ments to a school psychologist that inculpated the defendant with sexually abusing the child. Id. at
1028. The Court found that the statements to the psychologist did not fall under the hearsay ex-
ception for statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Specifically, the
Court held that the child's statements were not for medical treatment because the psychologist
sought out the child and "there was no showing that Mary's (allegedly abused child) purpose in
making the statements was for diagnosis or treatment... and thus no showing that Mary had a
strong motivation to be truthful." Id. at 1031-32. Therefore, because the statements did not meet
the hearsay exception, the Court did not conduct the appropriate Crawford testimonial inquiry.
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still be non-testimonial l n This Note believes that it is incorrect for some courts
to find it inconsequential in conducting the Crawford testimonial inquiry that
the medical examination of the child occurred during the course of a police in-
vestigative process. If the testimonial definition hinges on whether the declarant
reasonably believed the statements could be used prosecutorially, one would
expect that most children would believe that statements they made to a treating
doctor would be used prosecutorially in those situations when the police officers
are the very individuals who instructed the child and his or her family to retain a
physician about the alleged abuse. It would not take much, even for a younger
child, to make the connection between the police investigative apparatus and the
subsequent medical exam, and to conclude that any statement he or she makes
104 See People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 265 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). In Vigil, an allegedly abused
7-year-old gave incriminating statements about the defendant to the doctor. The Court found that
the doctor was a member of a child protection team, who conducted examinations for local area
hospitals when child abuse was suspected. Id. The Court also found that this same doctor had
provided extensive expert testimony in previous child abuse cases. Id. In the case at bar, the
doctor was asked to "perform a 'forensic sexual abuse examination' on the child and spoke with
the police officer who accompanied the child before performing the examination." Id. Based on
all of these facts, the Court concluded that the child's statements to the doctor were testimonial
because "[t]he statements were made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that they would be used prosecutorially." Id. The Court noted, "[allthough
the doctor himself was not a government officer or employee, he was not a person 'unassociated
with government activity.' The doctor elicited the statements after consultation with the police
and he necessarily understood that information he obtained would be used in a subsequent prose-
cution for child abuse." Id. See also People v. Harless, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 636 (Cal. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that an allegedly abused child's statements to the treating doctor during a sexual
abuse examination were testimonial because the examination had occurred in the course of a
district attorney's investigation of possible child abuse). But see People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d
846 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). In Cage, a mother with the help of a grandmother allegedly abused a
15-year-old child. Id. at 849. A police officer then found the child on the street near his home
and took him to the hospital emergency room. Id. Prior to a doctor examining the child, the po-
lice officer interviewed the child, who elicited incriminating statements about his mother. Id. After
the interview, a doctor examined the child, and the child reiterated to the doctor the incident again
incriminating his mother. Id. Finally, after the medical exam, the child was interviewed again by
the police officer. Id. Despite the intermittent involvement of the police officer before and after
the medical exam, the Court concluded that the child's statement to the doctor were non-
testimonial. Id. at 848. The Court found that "[n]o reasonable person in John's (child) shoes
would expected his statements to Dr. Russell to be used prosecutorially, at defendant's trial. This
is true even if he thought the doctor might relay his statements to the police. After all, anyone
who obtains information relevant to a criminal investigation might (and certainly should) pass it
along (sic) the police. This possibility, standing alone, does not suffice to make hearsay testimo-
nial within the meaning of Crawford." Id. at 855 (emphasis added). See also Heard v. Common-
wealth, 2004 WL 1367163 at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. June 18, 2004). Heard involved a domestic vio-
lence dispute in which an ex-husband allegedly assaulted his ex-wife by pistol-whipping her in the
head. Id. at *1. After the assault, the police and paramedics arrived on the scene and the ex-wife
made incriminating statements against her ex-husband. Id. The ex-wife was then taken to the
hospital, and she repeated the same inculpating statements against her ex-husband to the treating
physician. Curiously, and without much analysis, the court found the ex-wife statements to the
police officer to be testimonial, but the statements to the treating doctor only hours later to be non-
testimonial. Id. at *5.
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could be used against the defendant in a future trial proceeding. However, on the
other hand, an allegedly abused child's statements to a treating doctor that were
purely for a medical purpose and were not collateral to any police or govern-
mental investigation would more likely be non-testimonial. In these instances,
the child would have no way of reasonably knowing or believing that the medi-
cal exam concerning the alleged injuries would have anything to do with a fu-
ture prosecution of the alleged abuser. 105 Accordingly, a strong argument could
be made that the dividing line between testimonial and non-testimonial state-
ments for these types of declarations should turn upon whether the medical
exam was in some manner initiated by the police or the prosecution for investi-
gative purposes. If this fact or some derivative of it is present, then a court
should find that that a child would reasonably conclude that his or her state-
ments could be used in a future proceeding against the accused. Conversely, if
the medical examination is purely for medical purposes, it is unlikely that the
child would reasonably believe his or her statement will be used at a later trial
and Crawford should not apply.
C. Specific State Statutes that Create a Hearsay Exception For Children
Who Have Allegedly Been Abused and a Prosecutor's Ability to Utilize
Them Post-Crawford
As mentioned earlier in this Note, numerous states and the federal gov-
ernment have enacted statutes that ease the ability for allegedly abused children
to testify at trial.1°6 While not only relaxing the competency requirements,
many state legislatures have also created a hearsay exception that specifically
allows for a child declarant's statements to be admissible if certain conditions
are met. These so-called "tender years' 1 7 statutes, authored by a significant
amount of state legislatures, establish different parameters and provisions that
105 See, e.g., State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284 (Neb. 2004). In Vaught, the father of an alleg-
edly abused 4 year-old was bathing the child when he noticed that the victim was swollen and red
in the genital area. Id. at 286. The father briefly discussed the incident with the child's mother,
and they decided to take the child, on their own initiative, to the emergency room. Id. During the
medical examination, the victim made incriminating statements about the defendant and what had
caused the injuries. Id. The court held, based on the specific facts of the case, that the child's
statements to the treating doctor were non-testimonial because "the victim was taken to the hospi-
tal by her family to be examined and the only evidence regarding the purpose of the medical ex-
amination, including the information regarding the cause of the symptoms, was to obtain medical
treatment." Id at 291 Thus, the Court found that "[t]here was no indication of a purpose to develop
testimony for trial, nor was there an indication of government involvement in the initiation or
course of the examination." Id. See also, State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393, 396-97 (Minn.
App. 2005) (holding that a child's statement to a nurse practitioner was non-testimonial because
the nurse was not working in conjunction with any governmental investigation when the child
made the statements).
106 See supra notes 79-82.
107 For a complete list of all of the "tender years" statutes that have been enacted by the various
state legislatures see Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 39 n.7 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004).
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would allow these out-of-court statements to be admissible during a child abuse
prosecution.1°8 Generally speaking, while a minority of states have different
statutory conditions that must be satisfied, twenty-seven states have statutes that
hold admissible an allegedly abused child's out-of-court statements so long as
the statement has a "sufficient indicia of reliability," and the trial court finds that
the child was unavailable to testify at trial.1°9 In the past, these particular statutes
have greatly enhanced the state's ability to successfully prosecute the accused in
a child abuse case. 1°
However, because all of these statutes were written prior to Craw-
ford,1" many post-Crawford courts have begun to re-evaluate the manner in
108 See, e.g., CAL. EviD. CODE §1360 (2005). This statutory provision, in pertinent part, states
[i]n a criminal prosecution where the victim is a minor, a statement made by
the victim when under the age of 12 describing any act of child abuse or ne-
glect performed with or on the child by another, or describing any attempted
act of child abuse or neglect with or on the child by another, is not made in-
admissible by the hearsay rule if the all of the following apply ...(2) The
court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the
time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of
reliability; [and] (3) the child either: (A) Testifies at the proceedings [or] (B)
is unavailable as a witness, in which case the statement may be admitted only
if there is evidence of the child abuse or neglect that corroborates the state-
ment made by the child. (emphasis added).
See also FLA. STAT. ANN. §90.803(23) (2004):
Unless the source of information or the method or circumstances by which the
statement is reported indicates a lack of trustworthiness, an out-of-court
statement made by a child victim with a physical, mental, emotional, or de-
velopmental age of 11 or less describing any act of child abuse... is admissible
in any civil or criminal proceeding if (1) The Court finds in a hearing con-
ducted outside the presence of the jury that the time, content, and circum-
stances of the statement provided sufficient safeguards of reliability; and (2)
The child either: (a) Testifies; or (b) Is unavailable as witness .... Unavail-
ability shall include a finding by the court that the child's participation in the
trial proceeding would result in a substantial likelihood of severe or mental
harm." (emphasis added).
But see GA. CODE ANN. §24-3-16 (2004):
A statement made by a child under the age of 14 years describing any act of
sexual contact or physical abuse performed with or on the child by another or
performed with or on another in the presence of the child is admissible in evi-
dence by the testimony of the person or persons to whom made if the child is
available to testify in the proceedings and the court finds that the circum-
stances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability. (emphasis
added).
109 For examples of the specific language of these statutes, see supra note 108.
110 See, e.g., Fortner v. State, 582 So. 2d 581 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990), writ denied 582 So. 2d
587 (holding that the prosecution's successful application of Alabama's Tender Year's statute
against the defendant was constitutionally valid).
I A quick glance at these statutes demonstrates that the statutes were crafted to comply with
Ohio v. Roberts. While some states differ on whether the child must be deemed unavailable, all of
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which the prosecution utilizes them.'12 In light of Crawford, these statutes, and
the manner in which prosecutors use them, could be unconstitutional. Most
often, prosecutors have used these statutes for admission of an allegedly abused
child's out-of-court statements made to a variety of governmental actors who
were acting with an eye towards a possible criminal prosecution and during an
investigative process. 1 3 In most cases, state appellate and supreme courts have
struck down prosecutor's use of the tender years statute under these circum-
stances because it violates the rigors of Crawford. 14  As noted above, while
Crawford did not create a complete and firm definition of a testimonial state-
ment, the Court did specifically state that "[w]hatever else the term covers, it
applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand
jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations."'' 15 Many state courts have
interpreted this statement in Crawford to directly prohibit prosecutors from util-
izing the tender years statute at trial for all child hearsay made to any govern-
ment worker who is investigating suspected child abuse, unless that child was
subject to cross-examination. 16 These courts have substantial justification for
the statutes would allow the child declarant's testimony to be admissible so long as the court
found "sufficient indicia of reliability," which was clearly the framework of Roberts.
112 See, e.g., People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 756-57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (evaluating
the prosecution's use of California's tender years statute); State v. Herrmann, 679 N.W.2d 503,
508-5 10 (S.D. 2004) (analyzing the prosecutions use of South Dakota's tender years statute); In re
T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (discussing the post-Crawford applicability of Illinois'
tender years statute).
113 See, e.g., Snowden v. State, 846 A.2d 36, 47-48 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (using Mary-
land's tender years statute to admit an allegedly abused child's statements to a government child
protective services worker who was investigating suspected child abuse); State v. Herrmann, 679
N.W.2d 503, 510 (S.D. 2004) (applying South Dakota's tender years statute for out-of-court state-
ments made by the child to a social worker and two investigating police officers); People v.
Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 756 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (utilizing California's tender years statute
to admit at trial a child's out-of-court statements made to two police officers and a trained inter-
viewer of County's Multidisciplinary Interview Center, which specifically focuses on investigat-
ing and interviewing suspected victims of child abuse).
114 See supra note 112.
115 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (emphasis added).
116 See, e.g., T.P. v. State, 2004 WL 2418045 at **24 (Ala. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 2004). In
T.P., the child did not testify, and the prosecution, pursuant to Alabama's applicable statute, had
both an investigating police officer and a Department of Human Resources social worker testify at
trial concerning what the allegedly abused child had said to them during their interviews and
investigation. Id. at *2. The court held, "[u]nder these circumstances, we conclude . . . that be-
cause the interview was intended to be used as an investigative tool for a potential criminal prose-
cution, the interview is similar to a police interrogation and, thus, falls with the definition of "tes-
timonial" in Crawford v. Washington." Id. at *4. People ex rel. R.A.S., 111 P.3d. 487 (Colo. Ct.
App. 2004). In R.A.S., the prosecution, pursuant to Colorado's tender years law, had a police
investigator testify about what the allegedly abused child told him about the abuse in a forensic
interview that he conducted three days after the alleged incident. Id. at 488. The child was held
unavailable to testify at trial. Id. The Court held, "[h]ere, the statement was taken by an investi-
gating officer in a question and answer format appropriate for a child. The statement was "testi-
monial" within even the narrowest formulation of the Court's definition of that term." Id. at 490.
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their analysis of Crawford. Despite the lack of clarity in defining a testimonial
statement, the Court throughout its opinion was adamant that out-of-court decla-
rations made to government officials were plainly testimonial and should not be
admissible unless the declarant was unavailable and subject to prior cross-
examination. 117 Accordingly, Crawford will severely inhibit a prosecutor's abil-
ity to utilize these tender years statutes and have a government actor testify at
trial concerning conversations that official had with the allegedly abused child
during the pre-trial investigation.'
18
Moreover, a strong contention can be made that these statutes are poten-
tially problematic in other ways, as well. 19 The majority of these tender years
statutes hold admissible a child's out-of-court statements so long as the court
finds that the statements have a "sufficient indicia of reliability" and the child is
unavailable to testify at trial. 120 Because of Crawford, these particular statutes
are facially problematic fortwo additional reasons. First, the Crawford majority
was highly critical of allowing court's to make ad-hoc decisions on the types of
out-of-court statements they deem to be sufficiently reliable. 12 1 While the Court
did not hold that such analysis would always violate the Confrontation Clause, it
did state that if the out-of-court statement in question is deemed testimonial then
the declaration would be inadmissible, regardless of the apparent reliability,
unless the declarant was unavailable and subject to prior cross-examination.
122
On the other hand, Crawford states it is constitutionally acceptable for a court to
admit non-testimonial statements if they are found to possess an indicia of reli-
See also People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 757-758 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a
child's out-of-court statements to an investigating police officer and a multi-disciplinary inter-
viewer were testimonial). But see State v. Herrmann, 679 N.W.2d 503, 510 (S.D. 2004) (refusing
to analyze whether a child's out-of-court statements to two police officers and a social worker
were testimonial because the court found that even if the statements were testimonial they would
be subject to harmless error).
117 See generally Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53. The Crawford majority stated, "In sum, even if the
Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object, and
interrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely within that class." "[T]he Framers would
not have allowed admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial
unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination."
118 It is important to note, as mentioned earlier, that a child's out-of-court statements made to a
government official investigating possible child abuse would likely be testimonial under many
other hearsay exceptions as well, not just when the prosecution utilizes the tender-years statute.
See, e.g., supra note 97 (discussing how statements made by an allegedly abused child that quali-
fied under the excited utterance hearsay exception could be deemed testimonial when there was
government involvement in procuring such a declaration from the child).
119 For example, the prosecutors could also use the statute to get admissible out-of-court state-
ments made by a child to a parent or friend.
120 As noted above, the tender years statutes that allow judges to admit statements they deem to
be reliable stems from the Roberts decision, see supra note 2. See also supra note 108.
121 See supra note 4.
122 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
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ability. Tender years statutes fail to make this distinction and allow even a tes-
timonial statement to be admissible so long as the court finds the statement to be
reliable. 23 Secondly, and as a corollary to the first problem, most of these stat-
utes do not require the allegedly abused child to be subject to cross-examination.
Crawford specifically mandates that if a court finds the out-of-court declaration
to be testimonial in nature then the declarant must be subject to prior cross-
examination. 124 Not surprisingly, these statutes do not require prior cross-
examination of the allegedly abused child. Therefore, for both of these reasons,
theses statutes, in their current form, seem to violate the rigors of Crawford and
are most likely unconstitutional as currently written.
VI. CRAWFORD AND FORFEITURE OF A DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO CON-
FRONTATION
Crawford's adoption of the testimonial approach was an effort by the
United States Supreme Court to restore and safeguard what the Court believed
to be the procedural protections that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation provides. However, one instance where the Court explicitly be-
lieved that this testimonial approach and the defendant's constitutional right to
confrontation would be completely inapplicable is where a defendant forfeits his
or her right to confrontation by wrongdoing.' 25 In most jurisdictions, a defen-
dant' s potential forfeiture of his constitutional right to confrontation is governed
as a hearsay exception listed in the rules of evidence. 126 Generally speaking, a
123 Crawford noted this exact problem with the Robert's analysis. As the Court stated,
[t]his test departs from the historical principles identified above in two re-
spects. First, it is too broad: It applies the same mode of analysis whether or
not the hearsay consists of ex parte testimony. This often results in close con-
stitutional scrutiny in cases that are far removed from the core concerns of the
Clause. At the same time, however, the test is too narrow: It admits statements
that do consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere finding of reliability. This
malleable standard often fails to protect against paradigmatic confrontation
violations. Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
The Court further added, "[t]o add insult to injury, some of the courts that admit untested testimo-
nial statements find reliability in the very factors that make the statements testimonial." Id. at 65.
124 Id. at 68.
125 Crawford noted, "the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes con-
frontation claims on essentially equitable grounds . I..." d. at 62 (emphasis added). A number of
post-Crawford courts have acknowledged that the possibility that a defendant could forfeit his
confrontation right is still viable after Crawford. See, e.g,, State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 794 (Kan.
2004) (applying the rule of forfeiture to a defendant who killed a declarant); People v. Moore,
2004 WL 1690247 at *4 (Colo. Ct. App. July 29, 2004) (holding that a defendant forfeited his
right to confrontation when he killed the declarant).
126 The concept of a defendant forfeiting his right to confrontation is codified in Rule 804(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 804(b)(6) states that "[a] statement offered against a party
that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavail-
ability of the declarant as a witness" are admissible even though the declarant is unavailable as a
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defendant can be found by a court to have forfeited his constitutional right to
confrontation of a particular witness when the court finds by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant, through some manner of wrongdoing or mis-
conduct, which at least was partially motivated by a desire to prevent the decla-
rant from testifying at trial, procured and obtained the unavailability of that wit-
ness at trial. 127 The principal justification for preventing a defendant to assert
his or her constitutional right under these circumstances is to deter the defendant
from committing wrongful acts against potential witnesses at his or her trial.'28
As discussed throughout this Note, the testimonial approach of Craw-
ford will likely make it more difficult for the prosecution to introduce out-of-
court statements made by the allegedly abused child at trial. In large part, this
difficulty stems from a child's refusal to testify at trial because of the potential
psychological and emotional problems that may be caused if the child is forced
to confront and testify against the accused. One manner in which prosecutors
could deal with this dilemma is to argue that the defendant's alleged abuse of
the child has tormented and plagued the child to such an extent that the defen-
dant effectively forfeited his right to confrontation of the child at trial. Thus,
under this scenario, if the prosecution could prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the child was unavailable to testify at trial because of the alleged
abuse caused by the defendant then the child's out-of-court statements would be
admissible without the statements being subject to the requirements of Craw-
ford. Professor Richard Friedman is one academic commentator who strongly
witness. Many states also accept the idea of a defendant forfeiting his right to confrontation. See,
e.g., PA. R. EvimD. 804(b)(6).
127 See, e.g., United States v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 638 (7th Cir. 2000) (applying the prepon-
derance of the evidence standard governs for determining whether the defendant forfeited and
effectively waived his right to confrontation by procuring the unavailability of a witness); United
States v. Augiar, 975 F.2d 45, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1992) (also applying the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard for Rule 804(b)(6)); United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926-27 (8th Cir. 1999)
(stating that in order to forfeit one's right to confrontation, a defendant must procure the unavail-
ability of the declarant and did so, at least in part, because the defendant intended to make the
declarant unavailable to testify against him or her at trial); See also FED R. EviD. 804(b)(6) advi-
sory committee's note. According to the Advisory Committee, "[tihe usual Rule 104(a) prepon-
derance of the evidence standard has been adopted in light of the behavior the new Rule 804(b)(6)
seeks to discourage." The Advisory Committee also notes that for forfeiture purposes, a defen-
dant's wrongdoing does not need to actually consist of an illegal act.
128 See id. (citing United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982), cert denied
467 U.S. 1204 (1984)). "This [Rule] recognizes the need for a prophylactic rule to deal with ab-
horrent behavior 'which strikes at the heart of the system of justice itself."' See also United States
v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir 1997) (stating that "[s]imple equity supports a forfeiture
principle, as does a common sense attention to the need for fit incentives. The defendant who has
removed an adverse witness is in a weak position to complain about losing the chance to cross-
examine him." Accordingly, "[w]here a defendant has silenced a witness through the use of
threats, violence or murder, [the] admission of the victim's prior statements at least partially off-
sets the perpetrator's rewards for his misconduct." Id.).
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advocates this position for post-Crawford child abuse prosecutions. 29 Accord-
ing to Professor Friedman, the forfeiture rule should logically apply to those
situations where the alleged criminal act for which the accused is being tried is
the same act that forfeited his right to confront a particular witness. 3 °
Applying this reasoning presents a number of potential problems. First,
prosecutors have rarely, if ever, used such an argument per se, and instead have
only argued that a defendant's threats directed at the child after the alleged
129 See Adjusting to Crawford, supra note 6, at 12. Friedman states that "[tihe idea that the
accused cannot claim the confrontation right if his or her own misconduct prevents the witness
from testifying at trial is a very old one. Crawford explicitly reaffirms it, and justifiably so." Id.
(emphasis added).
130 See The Conundrum of Children, supra note 29, at 247. Friedman explains,
The forfeiture principle prescribes that if the accused's own wrongful conduct
is responsible for the inability of the witness to testify under the conditions
ordinarily required, the accused cannot object to use of the witness's prior
statement. This principle is well established as a matter of confrontation and
hearsay law, and it potentially has an important, though difficult, role to play
in child abuse cases. It is plain enough that the forfeiture principle is not ren-
dered inapplicable when the witness who was prevented from testifying at
trial is the victim of the crime being charged. The same logic should be taken
one step further: The forfeiture principle remains applicable even when the
conduct that allegedly rendered the witness unavailable to testify is the same
criminal conduct for which the accused is now on trial.
One potential problem with applying the forfeiture principle in this context is that defendants
would likely argue that it is fundamentally unfair and potentially unconstitutional to have a trial
judge on one hand assess whether the defendant, by a preponderance of the evidence, procured the
unavailability of the child by his or her abuse, and, on the other hand, having the jury later decide
the ultimate issue in the case of whether the defendant, beyond a reasonable doubt, committed the
underlying child abuse crime against the child.
To this argument, Friedman responds,
On closer analysis, I do not believe the objection carries weight. The situation
is analogous to the one that traditionally and often arises when a defendant is
accused of conspiracy charges and the prosecution argues that the hearsay rule
poses no bar to admission because the statement was made by a conspirator of
the defendant and in support of the conspiracy. The same factual issue may
arise as a threshold matter for evidentiary purposes and on the merits for de-
termining guilt, but so what? The issue will likely be decided for the two dif-
ferent purposes by two different fact finders-the judge deciding threshold
evidentiary matters and the jury determining guilt-and on different factual
bases, given that in determining admissibility issues the judge is not con-
strained by the ordinary rules of evidence.
ADJUSTING TO CRAWFORD, supra note 6, at 12.
See also People v. Baca, 2004 WL 2750083 at *1 l(Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004) (finding the rule of
forfeiture does govern when a court must determine "whether the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing
applies to cases such as this, where the defendant is being prosecuted for the same conduct that
rendered the hearsay declarant unavailable."); Meeks, 88 P.3d at 794 (agreeing with Richard
Friedman and others that the forfeiture principle should apply in this situation).
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abuse occurred could constitute forfeiture.13' This line of argument has received
mixed results from the courts.132 Secondly, a determination of whether a child's
refusal or inability to be available to testify at trial was based on the defendant's
actions or some other motivating factor would be a very difficult question for a
trial court. A child may be effectively unavailable to testify at trial for a number
of reasons outside of and not related to the actual alleged abuse, including a
child's age and maturity level, his or her general fear of a courtroom environ-
ment, or simply a parent or guardian specifically urging the child not to testify at
trial for fear that the child will become emotionally upset. 133 Clearly, if any of
these reasons were the sole justification for the child's unavailability to testify at
trial then a court would find that a defendant did not forfeit his right to confron-
tation and the Crawford analysis would still be applicable. Furthermore, it is
conceivable that an allegedly abused child could be unavailable partly due to the
defendant procuring his or her unavailability and partly because a parent or
guardian, in good faith, convinces the child not to testify at trial. Finally, there is
also an argument that the forfeiture of the defendant's right to confront a witness
because of the very act he or she is on trial for committing could violate a de-
fendant's basic due process protections. Undoubtedly, all of these potential
questions are very difficult, would require careful scrutiny by a trial judge, and
possibly could necessitate the trial judge appointing an expert to interview the
131 This Note was unable to find a single case that directly dealt with this particular argument.
While it is conceivable that some prosecutor somewhere will use this unique argument, this Note
was unable to find a court case on the issue. However, even though this Note did not find such a
case, this does not mean that such an argument would not be effective. In fact, considering how
Crawford dramatically changed the landscape on the introduction of hearsay at trial and its appli-
cation to a defendant's right to confrontation, prosecutors should be searching for innovative and
novel arguments to get an allegedly abused declarant's statements admissible at trial.
132 See State v. Sheppard, 484 A.2d 1330, 1348 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (holding that a
defendant forfeited his right to confrontation when the Court found, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the defendant procured the unavailability of the child to testify at trial by threaten-
ing to kill the child if the child told anyone about the alleged abuse). But see State v. Jarzbek, 529
A.2d 1245, 1253 (Conn. 1987) (holding that "although the threats made by the defendant against
the minor victim were similarly designed to conceal his wrongdoing, they were made during the
commission of the very crimes with which he is charged. We acknowledge that threats such as
those made by the defendant could potentially inhibit a witness, causing the witness to testify
untruthfully or to refuse to testify at all. The constitutional right of confrontation would have little
force, however, if we were to find an implied waiver of that right in every instance where the
accused, in order to silence his victim, uttered threats during the commission of the crime for
which he was on trial").
133 See The Conundrum of Children, supra note 29, at 253. Friedman catalogs the potential
problems in determining whether a child is unavailable solely because of the defendant's actions.
He states, "[t]he difficulties of applying the forfeiture principle in the context of child abuse are, I
concede, substantial. First, as in any case in which the principle is invoked, the court must resolve
the basic question that is often very difficult: Did the accused actually commit, or acquiesce in, the
wrongful act that assertedly rendered the witness unavailable? But in the case of a child witness,
the complexities only begin there." Furthermore, "[a]nother issue the court must resolve is
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child in order for the trial judge to make an ultimate decision on what actually
caused the child to be unavailable. Nevertheless, in light of the prospective
problems that Crawford may pose for a successful prosecution of child abuse,
prosecutors could make an argument, given the right set of circumstances, that
the defendant forfeited his or her right to confrontation by his alleged abuse and
could consequently render Crawford inapplicable to the particular case.
VII. ALTERNATIVES TO LIVE CHILD TESTIMONY
Crawford requires that an out-of-court statement that is deemed testi-
monial be held inadmissible unless the declarant is both unavailable and subject
to cross-examination. 134 As discussed above, there are some hearsay statements
made by the allegedly abused child that will unquestionably fit this testimonial
classification. 35 Therefore, in these circumstances, if the prosecution wants the
child's out-of-court statements to be admissible at trial, then the child must be
cross-examined. 136 Here, the greatest obstacle a prosecutor will face is finding a
successful method that will allow the child to be subject to effective cross-
examination by the defendant, but, at the same time, will also supply procedural
safeguards for the child witness that will take into account the child's potential
mental and emotional anguish that may arise from such cross-examination. For-
tunately for prosecutors, many states and the federal government already have
statutes that meet these seemingly incompatible goals.
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutional-
ity of a Maryland statutory scheme that allows a child to testify at trial, and
hence be subject to cross-examination, through closed circuit television. 37 In
Maryland v. Craig, a defendant was charged with, inter alia, child abuse on a
six-year old child. 138 Based on expert testimony, the prosecutor claimed that if
the child were forced to testify in the courtroom with the defendant present, the
child would suffer serious emotional distress and be unable to effectively com-
municate her testimony. 39 Therefore, the prosecutor invoked a state statute that
allowed a child, in such a situation, to testify via closed-circuit television. 4°
134 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
135 See supra note 118.
136 As mentioned in supra note 41, while unavailability is definitely part of the Crawford
analysis, the Court was silent in mandating a more stringent policy, compared to the more lenient
pre-Crawford analysis, for finding a child witness unavailable.
137 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). For a more detailed discussion of Maryland v.
Craig, see Jan Sanders, Protecting the Child Victim of Sexual Abuse While Preserving the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Rights of the Accused: Maryland v. Craig, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 495
(1991).
138 Craig, 497 U.S. at 840.
139 Id. at 842.
140 In short, the Maryland statute allows a victim of child abuse to testify through a one-way
closed circuit television if the trial court determines that the child would suffer serious emotional
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Despite the defendant's objection, the trial court granted the prosecutor's re-
quest, and the defendant was subsequently convicted. 41 On appeal, the defen-
dant argued that the use of such a statutory procedure violated the Confrontation
Clause. 142 The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 decision, disagreed. The Court held
that "[w]here necessary to protect a child witness from trauma that would be
caused by testifying in the physical presence of the defendant, at least where
such trauma would impair the child's ability to communicate, the Confrontation
Clause does not prohibit use of a procedure that, despite the absence of face-to-
face confrontation, ensures the reliability of the evidence by subjecting it to rig-
orous adversarial testing and thereby preserves the essence of effective confron-
tation." 143 The Court outlined the necessary constitutional requirements that a
trial court must make in order to permit such a procedure to be used.44
In light of Crawford's necessity of cross-examination in order for a trial
court to admit any out-of-court testimonial statements made by a child witness,
prosecutors should seek to use these kinds of statutory procedures, such as the
one used in Maryland v. Craig, on a more frequent basis. Currently, many states
and the federal government have statutes that authorize allegedly abused chil-
dren to testify via one-way closed circuit television, two-way closed circuit tele-
vision, or even by videotaped deposition. 45 While a minority of states have
found that these statutes violate a defendant's state constitutional right to con-
frontation,'46an overwhelming majority of states have constitutionally author-
distress if forced to testify in the courtroom. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102. The
statute further provides that
[o]nce the procedure is invoked, the child witness, prosecutor, and defense
counsel withdraw to a separate room, the judge, jury, and defendant remain in
the courtroom. The child witness is then examined and cross-examined in the
separate room, while a video monitor records and displays the witness's testi-
mony in the courtroom. During this time the witness cannot see the defen-
dant. The defendant remains in electronic communication with defense coun-
sel, and objections may be made and ruled on as if the witness were testifying
in the courtroom."
Craig, 497 U.S. at 841-42.
141 Id. at 843.
142 Id. at 842.
143 Id. at 857.
144 The Court specifically mandated that the "trial court must hear-evidence and determine
whether use of the one-way closed circuit television procedure is necessary to protect the welfare
of the particular child witness who seeks to testify. The trial court must also find that the child
witness would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the defen-
dant. Finally, the trial court must find that the emotional distress suffered by the child witness in
the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis, i.e., more than mere nervousness or ex-
citement or some reluctance to testify." Id. at 855-56.
145 For a list of some of the state statutes that authorize these various procedures see id. at 854
n. 2,3, and 4. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2000).
146 See, e.g., People v. Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ill. 1994) (holding that Illinois' Con-
stitution mandates that a defendant be entitled to face-to-face confrontation with a witness. Thus,
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ized the use of such a statutory scheme. 47  The prosecution's use of these stat-
utes in some circumstances could be vital in a post-Crawford world. Most im-
portantly, one scenario where a prosecutor should definitely invoke this type of
statute is when the trial court has deemed the allegedly abused child's out-of-
court statements to be testimonial. In this situation, because cross-examination
is necessary under Crawford, a prosecutor should argue to the trial court that
both examination and cross-examination of the child should occur through the
various alternative means that are specified in the particular state statute. Once
the prosecution makes the appropriate motion, so long as the prosecutor can
demonstrate that the child will suffer serious mental or emotional anguish by
testifying in the courtroom in front of the defendant, a trial court will most likely
grant the prosecutor's request.148 Where a trial court finds that the child's out-of-
court statements are testimonial, these statutes provide an excellent compromise
among all of the interested parties in a child abuse prosecution. The defendant's
constitutional guarantee to effectively cross-examine the child witness is se-
cured, the prosecutor will likely be able to successfully introduce the child's
out-of-court testimonial statements, and the allegedly abused child will be able
to testify in an alternative setting that, at the very least, will ease some of the
emotional and mental anguish that the child could potentially suffer. 149 In a
the Court held that "a witness who is examined by closed circuit television does not provide the
defendant with the face-to-face encounter envisioned by the drafters of the Illinois Constitution.");
Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 594 A.2d 281, 282 (Pa. 1991) (holding that the use of closed circuit
television to transmit the testimony of the allegedly abused child violates Pennsylvania's constitu-
tional right to confrontation).
147 See, e.g., Strickland v. State, 550 So. 2d 1042 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988), aff'd 550 So. 2d 1054
(holding that Alabama's statute allowing an allegedly abused child to testify under certain circum-
stances by videotape deposition, which is then played in front of the jury at trial, constitutionally
protects a defendant's right to confrontation.); Glendening v. State, 536 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1988),
cert. denied 492 U.S. 907 (upholding a similar statute as constitutional); State v. Thomas, 425
N.W.2d 641 (Wisc. 1988) (holding the state statute constitutionally acceptable and not in violation
of the defendant's right to confrontation). Some state courts, however, have yet to actually ad-
dress the state constitutionality of such statutes. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 62-6B-1 to 5 (2001)
(authorizing the taking of testimony of child witnesses through live, two-way closed-circuit televi-
sion); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §18-6-401.3 (West 2000) (authorizing a child witness to be exam-
ined and cross-examined by videotaped deposition). Generally speaking, most of these state stat-
utes allow for an alleged victim of child abuse to testify either through videotaped deposition or
closed circuit television so long as the trial court makes the requisite finding that the child will
suffer serious harm if he or she is forced to testify in the courtroom with the defendant present.
148 In reality, this kind of showing by a prosecutor will likely not be difficult. Undoubtedly,
almost all children, who have been allegedly abused, will suffer mental and emotional anguish
from the experience. Factor this anguish with forcing a child to testify in detail about the actual
event in front of the defendant, a prosecutor will most likely be able to demonstrate that the
child's testimony in the courtroom would seriously harm the child emotionally and mentally.
149 Obviously, in some circumstances, a child testifying by alternative means will have very
little impact on the child's mental and emotional anguish. Furthermore, it is possible that some
children or their caretakers will refuse to testify in this alternative manner, as well. However, this
should not deter prosecutors from at least attempting to use these alternative methods of testi-
mony. If a prosecutor can explain to the child (or likely the child's caretaker) that a successful
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post-Crawford world, prosecutors should look to these statutes as a viable
method to successfully admit an allegedly abused child's out-of-court testimo-
nial statements at trial.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Crawford v. Washington marked a radical change in the United States
Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding a defendant's right to confrontation.
The adoption by the Court of the so-called "testimonial" approach to govern
Confrontation Clause analysis, and the Court's failure to outline the boundaries
of such an approach, has created more questions than it has provided definitive
answers regarding the types of out-of-court statements forbidden by the Con-
frontation Clause. One important area where these questions will certainly be
raised is in the prosecution of child abuse and the introduction of an allegedly
abused child's out-of-court statements at trial. While the specific facts in Craw-
ford had nothing to do with child abuse prosecution per se, it is undoubtedly true
that Crawford will present significant obstacles to prosecutors all over the coun-
try in their attempt to successfully prosecute child abuse crime. Hopefully, this
Note has addressed some of these potential difficulties. In the future, as more
courts begin to analyze and attempt to define the boundaries of Crawford,
prosecutors will likely begin to understand the full ramifications that Crawford
poses to a successful child abuse prosecution. However, as it stands today,
Crawford's effect on child abuse prosecution remains to be seen.
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prosecution of the accused could hinge upon whether the child can at least testify in this alterna-
tive method then it is possible that some children or their caretakers will consent to this kind of
substitute testimony in order to secure a conviction against the accused.
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